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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-MICHIGAN DECLINES TO INCLUDE GREAT LAKES AND
CONNECTING WATERS IN ACT EXTENDING OWNER'S LIABILITY AND NON-RESIDENT SERV-
ICE TO WATERCRAFT. A 1957 Michigan statute designed to regulate watercraft through-
out the state, except on the Great Lakes and connecting waters thereof, provides that
the owner of watercraft shall be liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent
operation of such craft if it is being used with the owner's expressed or implied consent.
The act further provides that operation of watercraft on the waters of the state by a
non-resident shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such non-resident of the
secretary of state as attorney for service of process in any action against him resulting
from a watercraft accident. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 281.571-95 (Supp. 1958).
The power of a state to impose the appointment of the secretary of state for
service of process on a non-resident using the state highway was held not violative of
due process in the landmark case of Hess v. Pawloski.1 In Hess the Court reasoned that
since a state possessed the power to exclude non-residents from its highways, it could
admit them on the condition that the secretary of state would be their agent for the
purpose of service. The essential requirement in such statutes is that it must be reason-
ably probable that notice of service will be communicated to the non-resident defen-
dent.2 Similar statutes enacted in other states have been held not to be violative of due
process. 3 The authorization by state law of a state official as an agent for service of pro-
cess has been held valid in other situations where an element of police power is involved. 4
Courts have also upheld the validity of statutes imposing liability on the owner of
an automobile for injuries to third persons caused by the negligence of another using
the vehicle with the owner's express or implied consent.5 Likewise a statute that the con-
sent of the owner shall be conclusively presumed where the vehicle is being operated
by a member of his family has been sustained by the Michigan Supreme Court. 6
It appears that the basic question propounded by this act does not deal with the
validity of what it includes, but rather, the power of a state to regulate that which it
expressly excluded: the navigable waters of the United States.
The district courts of the United States were originally given power to decide "all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" by the Constitution.7 Congress imple-
mented this constitutional grant by providing that the district courts shall have exclusive
jurisdiction in "any case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."8
1 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
2 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928).
3 Morrow v. Asher, 55 F.2d 365 (N.D. Tex. 1932); Cohen v. Plutschak, 40 F.2d 727 (D.C.N.J.
1930).
4 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Davis v. Nugent, 90 F.Supp. 522
(S.D. Miss. 1950).
5 Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170,
164 N.W. 520 (1917); Downing v. City of New York, 220 N.Y.S. 76, aff'd, 245 N.Y. 597, 157 N.E.
873 (1927) (dictum).
6 Bowerman v. Sheehan, 242 Mich. 95, 219 N.W. 69 (1928). Consent will be presumed under the
present statute if the craft is operated by the owner's son or daughter. MIcH. COMp. LAWS § 281.580
(Supp. 1958).
7 U.S. CoNsr. art III, § 2.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1) (1949). It is interesting to note this section appeared first in the Judiciary
Act of 1789, sec. 9, 1 Stat. 76 (1789). The original wording differed in that it stated, "... saving to




At one time the extent of admiralty jurisdiction was thought to be limited to waters
subject to the "ebb and flow of the tide." 9 -By subsequent Congressional enactment this
admiralty jurisdiction was extended to include the Great Lakes.' 0 When the validity of
the act was questioned as an unauthorized extension of jurisdiction of the United States
courts, the Supreme Court in The Genesee Chief v. Fitshugh," held the act constitu-
tional on the ground that all navigable waters were within the scope of admiralty
jurisdiction when the Constitution was adopted. The Court also indicated, however,
that the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts would not impair
the right of the states to adjudicate controversies arising on navigable waters when
maritime law would not be applicable. Refering to the jurisdictional problems presented
by that act, the Court said: ". . . the act of 1845 extends only to such vessels when
they are engaged in commerce between different states .... And the state courts within
the limits embraced by this law exercise a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising
within their respective territories .... -12
Mr. Justice Holmes extended this position in The Hamilton13 reasoning that if the
state courts have the power to decide admiralty cases by common law remedies, chang-
ing them from time to time, "it would be strange if the State might not make changes
by its other mouthpiece the legislature.' 14
States, however, may not institute a change providing a remedy which the common
law was not competent to give.' 5 Thus, a state statute which allowed the injured party
to proceed by an action in rem was declared unconstitutional on grounds that such a
proceeding was not recognized at common law.1 6 Conversely, a state law providing an
action in personam was upheld against a defense that this infringed upon the exclusive
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States Courts. 17 That federal courts do not have
exclusive jurisdiction of suits in personam growing out of collision on navigable waters
seems to be admitted.' 8
Where a person employed to unload ships was fatally injured while on board the
docked vessel the Court -held a state workman's compensation law would not apply
because the tort was within admiralty jurisdiction. 19 Against a vigorous and famous dis-
sent, the majority asserted that the state law as applied to maritime controversies was un-
constitutional on the grounds of a needed uniformity of admiralty law.2 0 In the more re-
cent case of Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn2 ' the Supreme Court declared that admiralty
law should govern a maritime tort even though the injured party was seeking to enforce
a state-created remedy. The Court then went on to state: "While states may sometimes
supplement federal maritime policies, a state may not deprive a person of any substantial
admiralty rights as defined in controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions
of this Court. ' 2 2
The import of state maritime law may be seen in the subsequent case of Wilburn
Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.23 The Supreme Court held that where principles of
admiralty law are absent in a situation maritime by nature the judiciary will not fashion
one, but rather, permit the controversy to be decided by applicable state law.
9 DeLovio v. Bolt, 7 Fed.Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
10 5 Stat. 726 (1845) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1950)).
11 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
12 Id. at 458.
13 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
14 Id. at 404.
15 See note 11 supra.
16 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866); accord, Young v. Clyde S.S. Co., 294 Fed
549 (S.D. Fla. 1923). But see Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 .Wall.) 185 (1870).
17 Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1873)..
18 See Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U.S. 118 (1880); Carstens v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 71
F.Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1945).
19 Southern Pacific R.R. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
20 Id. at 217.
21 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
22 Id. at 409-10.
23 348 U.S. 310 (1954).
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It is readily apparent that the primary concern of Congress and the courts in
dealing with these problems is an adherence to the constitutional mandate of exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States courts in admiralty matters, which necessitates a
uniform application of law.2 4 The jurisdictional character of controversies involving
vessels engaged in maritime commerce is twofold, however, for it involves the commerce
power in addition to the general problem of admiralty jurisdiction. If the act in
question were extended to include the Great Lakes the commerce objection could have
been negated by the purpose of the statute, since it is designed primarily to deal with
the ever-increasing problem of small watercraft. To that end it is essentially a police
action, which has received constitutional sanction when exercised concurrently with
the commerce power in analogus situations.2 5 Similarly, the line of demarcation between
state and general maritime law has been drawn by the Supreme Court in Grant Smith-
Porter Co. v. Rohde:26 "As to certain local matters, regulation of which would work
no material prejudice to the general maritime law, the rules of the latter might be
modified or supplemented by state statutes."'27 Accepting this statement of concurrent
jurisdiction, two other states have enacted similar legislation 28 extending to the navigable
waters within their jurisdictions and both have been held constitutional on the district
court level. 29
It thus appears the courts are likely to declare a state law unconstitutional as
infringing on the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts where the relief
for the injured party is not a remedy provided by the common law, or where the law
controverts the existing maritime law for shipping and commercial trade, vitiating
the required uniformity. It would seem then, that were this act extended to the navigable
waters of the state it would not violate the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
in admiralty. This is because the remedy provided is in personam and since the act is
not designed to affect commerce, but merely to regulate watercraft of a local nature,
the statute represents a valid exercise of the state's police power. Furthermore, since
there are no existing federal laws regarding service or imputed negligence, the rule of
Wilburn Boat will apply.
The problem of collision and injury from negligent use of small watercraft is be-
coming increasingly paramount. This act takes a needed step forward to insure the
individual so injured a remedy in his own courts. There is no valid reason to withold
such procedures from the Great Lakes.
John A. Slevin
24 See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 (1789) which places particular import on vessels of
"ten or more tons"; 5 Stat. 726 (1845) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1950) which specifically included
only vessels "of twenty tons or upward ... employed in the business of commerce .... " Thus, the
limits imposed by the legislature on admiralty jurisdiction on the Great Lakes were designed to ex-
clude small watercraft. See also the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Wilburn Boat
Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., supra note 23, at 323, where he is concerned over the application of the
Court's opinion to "ocean-going vessels in international trade." 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1950).
25 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
26 257 U.S. 469 (1921).
27 Id. at 477.
28 LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3479 (1951); ILL. STAT. ANN. C. 110, § 263 (a-c) (Smith-Hurd 1956).
29 Franklin v. Tomlinson Fleet Corp., 158 F.Supp. 850 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Galtzman v. Rougeot,
122 F.Supp. 700 (W.D. La. 1954).
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PROPERTY - RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES - NEW YoRK ABOLISHES "Two-LIFE
RULE." - On September 1, 1958, a new rule against perpetuities, marking an historic
departure from the "two-life rule" went into effect in New York State. This new rule,
which applies to both real and personal property, as did the old rule, permits aliena-
bility to be suspended for any number of lives in being (instead of only two lives in
being as under the old rule) so long as their end is not unreasonably difficult to aiscer-
tain. Under the old rule,- a man with three children could not set up one trust to last
for the lives of these three children,' since alienability would thereby be suspended
for more than two lives. The new rule permits such trusts by allowing any number
of lives in being at the time the trust is created to be used in measuring the dura-
tion of the trust. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 42 (McKinney Supp. 1958) and N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1958).
Although several states followed the example of New York in adopting the "two-
life rule," the difficulties to which it gave rise finally led to its abandonment, either
in whole or in part, by these states.2 As a result, the "two-life rule," when applicable
to both real and personal property, was found only in New York prior to this recent
change.
The "two-life rule" has been criticized by legal scholars for a multitude of rea-
sons. It has been described as being needlessly restrictive by frustrating the reason-
able intentions of testators.3 It has been charged with giving rise to an enormous
amount of litigation, thus forcing the courts to expend their time and energy work-
ing out methods of avoiding the rigors of the rule, and making the work of the bar
unnecessarily difficult.4 It has been accused of causing a diversion of trust business
to other states,5 of causing an unequal federal estate tax burden in that the estate
tax could not be postponed beyond the end of two lives, 6 and of creating diversity in
the law.7 Opposition to change came from those who feared that the average duration
of spendthrift trusts would thereby be lengthened. s
The dissatisfaction of the courts with the "two-life rule" is evident in the re-
finements, fictions and strained constructions designed to circumvent it. One of
the devices used by the courts to save certain trusts was to view them as separable -
that is, capable of being sustained as separate trusts if not as a single trust - when-
ever it could be found that the income was payable in shares, and portions of the
corpus were to be released at some point at or before the termination of two lives. 9
It was also held that separability was dependent upon the testator's dominant purpose
as found by the court.1 0 Finally, where the suspension of alienability would have
I See In re Boreman's Estate, 68 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
2 Powell, Statutory Change in the New York Rule Against Perpetuities, 139 N.Y.LJ. 58, 59,
p.4, col. 1 (March 25, 26, 1958), reprinted in 1 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 35, 37-38 (McKinney Supp.
1958) hereinafter cited as Powell, Statutory Change. The states which adopted and then discarded
the "two-life rule" are: North Dakota (abolished in 1877), Wisconsin (1927), Mississippi (1930),
and Michigan (1949).
3 See 1936 N.Y. Law Revision Commission 475, 477, and GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPErUrrlas
687 (4th ed. 1942) (" . . . in no civilized country is the making of a will so delicate an operation,
and so likely to fail of success, as in New York.")
4 1936 N.Y. Law Revision Commission 475, 479. See also GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 687,
stating that from the pasage of the "two-life rule" in 1830 until 1941 there had been over 800
cases litigated in the various New York courts on the problem.
5 See Governor's Memorandum, in McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. A-150 (1958).
6 Looker, Practical Effects of Differences in the Rule Against Perpetuities, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES
653 (1951).
7 Reform of Rule Against Perpetuities, 92 TRUSTS & ESTATES 768 (1953).
8 See 1936 N.Y. Law Revision Commission 475, 481-82.
9 See On v. On, 147 App. Div. 753, 133 N.Y. Supp. 48, affd 212 N.Y. 615, 106 N.E. 1037
(1914) (also involving a complex differentiation between original shares and subshares).
10 See In re Homer's Will, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924) where, although there was no
division of either corpus or income into shares and no provision for releasing any share upon the
death of a beneficiary, the court, having found "a constructive division into shares, atoms within
the mass, each with its own several life," held the trust to be valid.
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been legal but for some portion of the trust, or because of some ultimate limitation
placed thereon, the courts would save the trust by severing the invalid portion."
However, this excision of the invalid portion raised further questions as to distortion
of the testator's intent12 and the acceleration of interests following the termination of
the trust.' 8 These problems continued to plague the courts and, at times, defeat the
testamentary scheme.
Much of the doctrine pertaining to the old rule will remain of equal value un-
der the new rule. The rule continues to apply both to the duration of trusts to re-
ceive and apply, and to the period during which the ascertainment of the ultimate
takers of the corpus can be postponed. 14 Under the new rule, as under the old, there
is no provision for a period in gross either in addition, or as an alternative, to lives
in being. This failure to provide for a period in gross has been ameliorated by the
courts in cases of trusts limited upon the attainment of a certain age, by the finding
that such trusts might also be terminated by the death of the beneficiary.' 5 Under
the doctrine of "relation back," whereby the validity of instruments in execution of
powers is tested acording to the law in force at the time of the creation of the pow-
er,1 6 the "two-life rule" will continue to be applicable to powers created prior to the
effective date of the new rule. Furthermore, although not necessarily connected with
the law of perpetuities, remnants of the "two-life rule" are left in the provisions per-
mitting only two legal life estates before a remainder takes effect.' 7
The evidentiary test, which requires that the lives or minorities measuring the
permissible period be neither so designated nor so numerous as to make proof of
their end unreasonably difficult, has been criticized by one group, the Surrogates' As-
sociation, as being a likely source of substantial litigation.18 However, in the past
century there has been only a handful of American cases19 involving this test, which
was first enunciated by a common law court in 1805.20 One problem for the future
arises from the fact that the New York reports contain many precedents embodying
the strained constructions designed to circumvent the old rule. It is to be hoped that
the courts will regard these as no longer needed when similar cases arise in the future.
Although it is regrettable that no provision was made for a period in gross,
New York's acceptance of the "multiple-lives rule" is a welcome one. Indeed, it was
very difficult to find any justification for the arbitrary "two-life" limitation. In the
light of this change, wills containing trust provisions should be reviewed to see
whether changes can be made to carry out the wishes of the testator more simply
or more completely, or to effect estate tax savings by continuing a single trust for
a longer period of time.
Lawrence I. Bradley
11 Smith v. Chesebrough, 176 N.Y. 317, 68 N.E. 625 (1903) (trust for two years excised).
12 Benedict v. Webb, 98 N.Y. 460 (1885) (excision would create too great a distortion of the
testators intent).
13 Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 173 N.E. 676 (1930) (accelerated), and In re Silsby, 229
N.Y. 396, 128 N.E. 212 (1920) (not accelerated).
14 Powell, Statutory Change; 1 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 35, 37 (McKinney Supp. 1958).
15 Sawyer v. Cubby, 146 N.Y. 192, 40 N.E. 869 (1895). And for an especially strained con-
struction see Kahn v. Tierney, 135 App. Div. 897, 120 N.Y. Supp. 663, ajf'd mem. 201 N.Y. 516,
94 N.E. 1095 (1911) where, notwithstanding the apparent intention of the testator that the trust
should continue until the youngest child reached twenty-six, or at least until five years after her
death, the court found that "five years from" modified "arriving at twenty-one years" but was
not to be carried forward so as to qualify "her death" which was to be read "at her death."
16 N.Y. REAL PROP LAW §§ 178, 179.
17 N.Y. REAL PROP LAW §§ 43, 45, 46.
18 See Memorandum of Counsel to the Governor, reprinted in McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y.
A-140, A-141 (1958).
19 Powell, Statutory Change; I N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAw 35, 39 (McKinney Supp. 1958).
20 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Vesey 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1039 (1805).
